Building "National" Armies—Building Nations?

Determinants of Success for Postintervention Integration Efforts

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This article surveys recent cases of internationalized state building in postintervention, post–(ethnic) conflict societies in the light of an academic tradition that has seen military forces as a particularly effective vehicle for integrating a country's diverse populations. It is argued that armed forces that are ethnically representative in their composition and leadership can encourage a sense of commonality across ethnic boundaries, which can help secure a fragile peace. However, the connection between representativeness and integration is intricate; and whereas outside powers may enable otherwise unlikely outcomes, their leverage is circumscribed by a number of factors. The article also suggests that an ethnically representative army may "tie up" capabilities in ways that reduce the likelihood of military intervention in politics or (ethnic) violence perpetrated by military personnel.

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Over the past decade, national armies—military forces that are representative of a country's ethnic composition within both the ranks and the officer corps—have been set up by outside powers as part of security sector reform after military intervention in a number of countries. Security sector reform, such as the establishment of new armed forces, clearly falls within the realm of *state*building.[1] But could it also contribute to *nation*building and thereby to peacebuilding?

In societies where the front lines of recent armed conflict have followed ethnic boundaries, the political salience of ethnicity is very high. For both locals and outsiders, it is easy to perceive ethnic identities as fixed in both character and intensity. Ethnic integration in the sense of *assimilation* (reidentification into a dominant group) is very unlikely to take place under such circumstances. In this article, however, integration and nationbuilding are both understood as describing a process of (re)building a sense of community within a polity, without the need for members of different ethnic groups to change the *character* of their ethnic identity. Even in a postconflict situation where "everything is ethnic," a reduction of the political salience of ethnicity can take place and may even be essential to securing a fragile peace.[2] The design of political institutions—often divided into the categories of constitutional design, electoral-system design, and (de)centralization/federalism—provides a number of tools for this purpose.[3] However, cumulative progress toward a de-ethnicization of politics can also be made within many other arenas, both formal and informal.

A substantial literature now exists on the role of security sector reform (SSR) in conflict resolution and peacebuilding.[4] Within this literature, the importance of addressing ethnic divisions is frequently mentioned. However, despite broad agreement on its significance, analysis of the subject has rarely been in-depth. Reference has been made mostly in passing, noting the challenges involved in integrating former enemies or securing fair ethnic representation in the new forces. The focus of this article is on junctures where SSR, peacebuilding, and ethnic relations meet. Its point of departure is an academic tradition that has seen the military as a particularly effective vehicle for integrating a country's diverse population. The article relates this tradition to recent cases of post–(ethnic) conflict, postintervention, internationalized statebuilding, where outsiders are trying to actively generate integration. The cases discussed—the primary focus is on Afghanistan, Kosovo, and Iraq, but the article also draws on other cases, including Bosnia and East Timor—differ on several important counts from the newly independent colonies that were at the center of attention when this scholarship first emerged. Yet the aspirations attached to new armies as an integrative force are similar today,[5] and the importance of encouraging a sense of commonality across ethnic boundaries is probably even more acute.

The ambition of this article is not to explore the full range of possible connections between the above cases and theory but rather to highlight aspects relevant to nationbuilding that emerge from the cases in question.[6] Although a fairly broad range of cases is examined, analytical focus is not on generalization to a complete universe of cases but on how the cases relate to previously developed theory.[7]

As a background to the discussion of the integrative potential of the national army in the cases examined, the article is introduced by a brief summary of the academic tradition regarding the military's role in nationbuilding, along with an outline of key traits that make the cases considered here different from those "traditionally" considered in this literature. The first section analyzing the recent cases considers the complex relationship between ethnic representativeness and the legitimacy of

postconflict armed forces. Thereafter, the article moves on to present some examples of how the leverage of outside powers has made a difference to the integrative potential of new armies but also how the real value of some achievements may be exaggerated. The final section returns to the broad introductory question regarding the national army's contribution to securing a fragile peace, asking how a national army might contribute to peacebuilding even if it should be found wanting in terms of a direct integrative effect.

Academic Tradition: The Integrative "National" Army

The view that the military is a particularly effective instrument for (ethnic) integration was prevalent in contributions to modernization theory in the 1960s and 1970s. Several traits characterizing armed forces were pointed to as facilitating integration: the military being perhaps the most modern institution in an underdeveloped country, the isolation of military personnel and the "total" nature of the institution, the military's emphasis on rationality, its strict hierarchy and opportunities for social mobility regardless of ethnic and other background, and its service centered on "national purposes" shared by different groups.[8] The mechanisms that have been assumed to make nationbuilding happen may seem both simple and commonsensical: this effect could be limited to the servicemen and servicewomen themselves and in such cases results from soldiers' being provided with patriotic education or, more indirectly, from their possibly risking their lives for a "common cause"; rotating to different parts of the country; and learning to know people from other ethnic, social, and geographic backgrounds. The nationbuilding effect of the army could also impact on the wider society. One mechanism here might be military personnel returning home and disseminating their new "national" inspiration among people in the areas from which they originally came. Another mechanism of integration could be that civilians on the outside see the army in operation, engaged in activities for "common causes," and thereby start thinking more in terms of what interests they may share with people of other ethnic groups.[9]

Belief in the integrative power of the military—and in particular the large conscript army—has also been prominent among political leaders. In the Soviet Union, where the belief in social engineering was very strong, Slavs filled almost all top military positions. In the ranks, however, Dimitri K. Simes found that the military performed "a crucial socializing role," turning young men into true communist loyalists.[10] Ellen Jones explained the Soviet leadership's policy of having an integrated military, even if it would reduce operational effectiveness, through reference to the "Sovietizing" effect: from the socialization standpoint, "those individuals who are least desirable from a narrowly military perspective are those who are most in need of the socialization training and Russian-language environment offered by the military experience."[11]

The most significant feature of acculturation within the army, wrote Lucian W. Pye in the early 1960s, is that "it usually provides some form of training in citizenship. Recruits with traditional backgrounds must learn about a new world in which they are identified with a larger political self."[12] Compared with other institutions of a new state, the military offered greater probability of equal treatment, argued Morris Janowitz: "The result is a sense of cohesion and social solidarity, because men of various regional and ethnic backgrounds are given a common experience and come to think of themselves as Indian, Egyptians, or Nigerians," he wrote.[13] In cases such as the newly independent colonies, then, modernization theorists would expect the army to contribute to a development where state boundaries went from "lines in the sand" to markers separating populations, each sharing a sense of oneness that transcended tribal and ethnic divisions.

Gradually, academic optimism about development and national integration shifted toward greater skepticism, as one newly independent African state after the other came under military rule, and military rule also came to dominate in Latin America. Attention was now less on the military as an integrative institution per se but, rather, on the performance of military *regimes*—including on issues of national integration. On the whole, the verdict was negative. Again, special traits of military forces—such as impatience with opposition and a simplistic view of the possibility of generating social change—were put forward as explanations. Even in cases where a military regime insisted that it was "above ethnicity," its inability to properly appreciate the significance of communal divisions often caused situations to go from bad to worse. In the late 1970s, Eric A. Nordlinger found that most political scientists who had addressed this problem had concluded, like the praetorians themselves, that military governments were particularly well suited for the task of military integration. In real fact, however, military governments in deeply divided societies had usually been unwilling or unable to contain internal conflict: "They have generally exacerbated them, sometimes bringing about an explosive outcome," argued Nordlinger. He pointed to Iraq, Sudan, Nigeria, Indonesia, Burma, and Pakistan as cases where their poor performance had been "exceptionally evident."[14] In a 1991 study, Dietz, Elkin, and Roumani surveyed the literature thus far on the military as an integrative tool. They concluded that social integration would be difficult to make happen in the best of circumstances: such results "are not empirically automatic or even likely."[15]

A New Reality

Today, decades after this literature began to emerge, the new reality of military interventions and internationalized statebuilding may expand it with new perspectives. "Nationbuilding" and "regime change" are at the heart of current U.S. foreign policy, reflecting an increasing belief at the international level that it is possible to

manage change in a state. However, a range of traits that define the cases considered in the present article would seem to make national integration in these cases even more unlikely to succeed than in the cases considered in the early literature: First, the national army is set up in a postconflict situation,[16] after conflict where front lines may have followed ethnic lines. Second, the regime that has been overthrown itself had a particular ethnic profile—the Serb nationalist regime of Slobodan Milosevic, the overwhelmingly Pashtun Taliban, and the Sunni-favoring regime of Saddam Hussein; in such cases, opposition to the regime tends to mirror the nature of the regime itself, intensifying divisions, and the overthrow of the regime means that the ethnic or religious groups it favored will feel disempowered and at risk. Third, the integrative efforts are driven by outside actors, whose legitimacy may be challenged (up to the level of armed resistance) and whose understanding of the society may be shallow. Finally, fourth, the new level of ethnic equity is typically part of a broader agenda of democratization that in the short term is complicating coercive efforts toward peace*making*. Besides these, an additional trait is likely to be that outside powers are in a hurry to achieve results—to deliver to their home audiences and to take care of their own exit strategies.

These issues notwithstanding, outside powers are deeply engaged in democratization and the consolidation of peace in a number of countries (and a substantial academic literature has emerged on the topic of democratization from outside).[17] Addressing ethnic divisions is an important element of such efforts. In the following two sections, this article will specifically consider that dimension. The first section will examine how ethnic representativeness is being sought in military forces and how that may relate to the legitimacy of new forces and political processes more broadly. The second will delve deeper into the workings of integrative policies, discussing strengths and limitations of outside leverage in this context.

Gaining Legitimacy through Ethnic Representativeness

Many authoritarian and military regimes have had armed forces (as well as other institutions) that reflected ethnic favoritism and the view that some groups were more reliable to the regime than others; state elites tend to have in their minds what Cynthia Enloe has called "ethnic state security maps," mirroring their views regarding the political dependability of different ethnic groups.[18] "Ethnic armies" may be the main tool of oppression in a state, and their methods may range from coercion to extreme violence (such as that used against Kurds and Shi'ites under Saddam Hussein). Ethnically targeted violence may have been a driving factor of recent armed conflict, or a defining trait of it.[19] At the very least, a skewed ethnic composition of the armed forces (notably with one or some groups overrepresented at senior levels, or generally in forces closer to the political power) would seem to be

a symptom of what was wrong with the political order, representing, for example, a social order where ethnic differences to a significant extent also coincide with economic differences. In many such cases, the ethnic composition of a new, post-conflict army has been identified by scholars as a key issue for the legitimacy of the army itself and for the new political regime. A history of inequity between ethnic groups severely complicates parallel processes of democratization and peacebuilding in postconflict societies. After a long-lasting conflict that ends without outright victory for one party, the future role of the armed forces in the society, including the composition of the new armed forces, is one major factor in determining whether peace agreements will hold. In many cases, Mats Berdal has found, winning legitimacy requires paying particular attention to the ethnic composition of the forces, "not least because the potential for destabilization is particularly acute when there is an 'ethnic dimension' to political tensions between ex-combatants."[20] Recommendations for the composition of new postintervention armies reflect the same view: "We say goodbye to ethnic, religious and regional practices," stated Abdul Rahim Wardak, speaking in favor of meritocracy in the hiring for the Afghan National Army (ANA) when he was named Afghan minister of defense in late 2004.[21] A critical feature of the new Iraqi armed forces is that they are to be "truly national," wrote Walter B. Slocombe, who served in 2003 as a senior adviser to the Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad. "The units that are being trained will be representative—at both officer and enlisted levels—of the demography of the country as a whole," he added.[22]

The postconflict national armies considered here are all professional, recruited forces (Bosnia's four-month service was abolished by the end of 2005). In each of the cases, it seems likely that external security will be mostly taken care of by external forces for the foreseeable future, so the size of the new forces has been kept quite low. For a large conscription army, ethnic representativeness will take care of itself, as long as there is no imbalance in real access or willingness to serve, or in upward mobility within the force. By virtue of the attention paid to the ethnic composition of the new national armies, these may in terms of representativeness come out similar to larger conscription armies elsewhere, even if the recruitment process is different. In this context, one further point of comparison is also of interest on the issue of legitimacy: the emergence of the "mass army" after the French Revolution connected citizens' duty to serve with their rights vis-à-vis the state. The modern army was not only an instrument of the state, argued Jacques van Doorn; as a national army, it "gave expression to the will of the people and their collective loyalty."[23] Maury D. Feld has described the mass army as "the politically inspired creation of an integrated society, the nation-in-arms" and as closely connected to the emergence of the nation-state.[24] In the process of democratization that has followed military intervention in the cases considered in this article, legitimacy for the military is sought from its mirroring the society from which it springs. And conversely, the existence of the representative military is hoped to generate cohesion within that society.

After armed conflicts with a clear winner and/or clear loser(s), new armies have typically been built on the core of a victorious force, with losers demobilizing with little or no support.[25] In many ways, however, the SSR efforts after the interventions considered here—even if they have signified the clear defeat of a regime—look more like situations of negotiated settlement, if not in terms of political actors engaged, then in terms of *ethnic groups* they may seem to represent. The leaders and political groups who held power may be out, but conscious—and often costly—attempts are being made to engage the ethnic or religious groups that they may be seen to represent. In each of the cases, the postintervention phase has signified a new level of attention paid to the ethnic composition of the territory's military forces. This has been done at least in part on the assumption that more demographically representative forces contribute to increasing the legitimacy both of the army itself and of the new political order generally. Also, this is done in a context where democratic institutions and mechanisms are being introduced, and justifying an ethnically unbalanced security sector would be difficult.

Although these new regimes replace ones that did favor certain ethnic groups—as in Afghanistan, Iraq, or Kosovo—assuming a direct connection between representativeness and legitimacy may still be too optimistic. Ethnic groups that may be losing influence are not inclined to see themselves as gaining in any way from increased proportionality. When conditions are such that "everything is ethnic"—often owing to the active encouragement of an earlier regime or other leaders in a conflict[26]—groups may not necessarily wish to employ influence gained for the good of a new, uncertain "multiethnic" project of democratization.

Part of the challenge, then, is to readjust the privileged ethnic groups' idea of their position in society. Assurances about representation are not always a question of assuring vulnerable *minorities*. In Afghanistan, Pashtuns, who make up not a majority but the largest ethnic group, have been used to holding disproportionate power. While the Hazara were always represented in the army, for example, they would be less present higher up in the hierarchy; upward mobility was not equal between members of different ethnic groups. After the U.S.-led defeat of the Pashtun-dominated Taliban in late 2001, Panjsheri Tajiks gained the upper hand in Kabul, not least through their control over the ministries of defense and the interior. Since then, rather than simply accepting the new state of affairs, outside powers have used considerable leverage to promote the legitimacy of the new political institutions among skeptical Pashtuns.[27] Adjusting the composition of the ranks and officer corps of the new ANA has become a key factor for this purpose, its importance underlined by reports of Tajik officers' abuse of recruits from other ethnic groups. In spring 2004, the United States indicated that the ANA was then roughly ethnically representative of the wider population.[28] More recent reports, however, hold that Panjsheri Tajiks are increasingly unhappy about having had to give up some of the power that "their" warlords gained with the fall of the Taliban:[29] the ethnic security dilemma has come full circle.

In a similar fashion, in recent decades power had been held disproportionally by Sunni Arabs in Iraq. The post-Saddam political process, however, has provided Shi'ites with an opportunity to put their numerical dominance to use. After the fall of Saddam Hussein, there is little more than the weight of the United States that can ensure that majority rule will not completely sideline Sunnis—or that the country itself will not break up. There is a great danger of permanent (self-)exclusion of Sunni Arabs in national "electoral democracy" processes with a strong electoral census profile, as seen in the January 2005 elections and the October referendum on the draft constitution. As for the now-disbanded Iraqi army, this was described in 2003 by the International Crisis Group (ICG)—despite the overrepresentation of Sunnis at senior levels—as the "last remaining symbol of sovereignty and national unity." The ICG has criticized key SSR policies in Iraq, including the decision to disband the army, as being "at a minimum ... poorly thought out and recklessly implemented." It warned specifically against further Sunni alienation and suggested of the new Iraqi army that, "far from helping to forge a new collective national identity, it will become an arena for renewed internal political, sectarian and ethnic conflict."[30] Important attempts have been made to involve Sunnis in the building of the new institutions, even when not strictly necessary according to the election mandate alone. The scenario that may be in the process of playing out, however, is that militant Sunnis who will not accept more equitable power relations—or who anticipate that the Shi'ite majority will take advantage of its dominant position to oppress other groups—will be able to escalate conflict in the country to the point of full-blown civil war.

External Leverage: Achievements and Limitations

If we consider more closely lessons from recent cases of SSR driven by outside powers, we find not only important achievements—suggesting that outside powers can indeed have a decisive impact on such processes—but also examples of serious problems that indicate limitations to what can be achieved.

The integrative power of an armed force depends not only on its ethnic mix per se, but also on the actual nature of interethnic relations within the force. The achievement of a proportional composition of the army—as has been announced in Afghanistan—might serve as a handy item for outside actors involved to tick off on a "mission accomplished" list, somewhat similar to the holding of elections: symbolically important, but not necessarily representing a deeper transformation. Among the main institutional-design options available in the postconflict situation—building an army from scratch, drawing existing forces into a new army, or merging existing forces—the latter may be the one that comes with the greatest risk of in-fighting and poor integration. As we have seen, outside powers have demonstrated a will to compose ethnically representative forces. A somewhat different question is

whether they should involve *all* former *fighting parties* in the creation of the new military. After a conflict with an ethnic dimension, there may be little doubt which forces represent which ethnic groups, and sidelining some forces might serve to alienate members of ethnic groups accordingly. *The Responsibility to Protect*, the report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, made the point that, in the rebuilding of new national armed forces and police, "integrating as far as possible elements of the formerly competing armed factions or military forces" is a process "vital to national reconciliation and protection of the re-established state once the intervening forces leave."[31] However, the report added, this is also a process that intervening authorities have often found too long-term and that international donors have found too expensive and too sensitive to pursue to completion.

   In the short and middle term, certain forces do indeed provide authorities with a very difficult balancing act: if hostile elements are integrated into the new forces, there is a risk that they will act as spoilers within those forces. This has been a key consideration when analysts have warned against integrating most of Iraq's intelligence services and elite military units—such as the Republican Guard, known to be the most "Saddam-loyal" and ruthless—within the new Iraqi security forces. If, on the other hand, some forces are completely left out, it becomes all the more important to make sure that they are thoroughly disarmed and demobilized, so that they are not likely to enter into criminal and antiregime activities. A severe example of poor planning leading to the opposite outcome is the May 2003 decision by the U.S. administrator in Iraq, Paul Bremer, to disband the entire Iraqi army of 350,000 men. Though this decision was awkwardly reversed later, much damage had already been done: tens of thousands of men were sent into unemployment, armed and disgruntled.[32] Ways existed to avoid integrating the most notorious forces in the new army without giving up on the ambition of engaging the different ethnic or religious groups. A greater sense among the population that the new forces were indeed Iraqi could have been the result.

   In Afghanistan, warlords (many doubling as governors or government ministers) have shown great adaptability in responding to requirements in the Afghan New Beginnings Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) program, while maintaining their coercion-based power. Ahmad Fahim Hakim, the deputy leader of the Independent Human Rights Commission, argued that hiring for the ANA has been too focused on quantity at the expense of quality: "The ex-Mujaheddin have only replaced their uniforms; they have kept their loyalty to their previous commanders and militia groups. By day the men are national army or national police, but by night they represent their previous affiliation." In places with factional fighting, people welcome the ANA as a stabilizing force, but in some cases it is the other way around, argued Hakim: "Since the recruitment process is not transparent, people will think the soldiers are just the same old guys—and in some ways they are right." The rivalry between different factions, in other words, is now to some

extent playing out *within* the new security institutions. One consequence of this is a number of armed clashes between military and police forces in the fall of 2005.[33] These points serve to underline that contact between members of different groups does not in every instance serve to break down ethnic barriers—although that assumption has featured in parts of the military sociology literature.[34]

If the restructuring of military forces to make them more representative of a country's population is to contribute to nationbuilding and conflict prevention, one requirement is that units be integrated: "ethnically mixed (not segregated) units must be formed, trained, and deployed," argued one conflict resolution enterprise.[35] It is not hard to point to problems that may come with such an approach—introducing Sunni Arabs from other parts of the country into military units in Iraq's Kurdish provinces, for example. However, a good case could be make for a sensitive approach of this kind for the purpose of holding the country together. One prominent example of a different outcome has been the case of Bosnia, which ten years after the Dayton agreement in practice had three armed forces, each ethnically homogeneous. Next to the Bosniak-Serb force were the Bosniak-Croat and Bosniak-Muslim components of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) Army, which was originally designed as a single force.[36] These military forces were one of several expressions of the thorough institutionalization of ethnicity that has taken place in Bosnia, a development that has caused many analysts to deem the post-Dayton consociational framework a failure.[37] Such a setting does not encourage a softening of ethnic divisions that were intensified with the war; on the contrary, conditions continue to inspire citizens to ask, "Why are we living together?" Permanently, ethnically compartmentalized units serve to uphold ethnic divisions within the army and arguably also within society itself.

The case of Bosnia by the end of 2005, however, also provides important examples of how outside powers under certain conditions can bring about integration that otherwise would not happen. In mid-2005, the first mixed Serb-Bosniak-Croat Bosnian contingent (of thirty-six troops) completed training and was dispatched to serve with the coalition forces in Iraq.[38] And in October, a NATO-engineered defense reform law was passed by the parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina that entailed the merging of Bosnia's forces into one NATO-compatible force, under one chain of command and financed from a unified budget. The reform abolished conscription as of January 1, 2006, replacing it with a professional army of nine to ten thousand.[39] The long-term sustainability of achievements in this field might be questioned; local nationalist media and politicians might do their best to maintain the conflict level; still, progress is not bound to be reversed, and a strategy of publicizing achievements could consolidate progress.

In situations with a high level of suspicion between ethnic groups and against outside powers exerting influence, one major way of improving the legitimacy—and thus the nationbuilding potential—of the new army is to make changes to its top leadership. For analyzing ethnic representativeness, Cynthia Enloe has argued that

for both a state bureaucracy and for military or police forces "sheer numerical measures are misleading and naïve."[40] The relative distribution in the different levels of hierarchy and the significance of different agencies are among the parameters that need to be taken into account in a nuanced analysis of representativeness. Again, Afghanistan is a good illustration: for three years after the 2001 Bonn conference, Defense Minister (and Vice President) Mohammad Qasim Fahim was widely seen as a major obstacle to security sector reform. While overseeing the establishment of the ANA, Fahim also had his own forces, which effectively controlled Kabul. A warlord representing the Panjsheri Tajiks who gained the upper hand in Kabul with the defeat of the Taliban, Fahim was far from being the right person to reach out to the large Pashtun population. However, an important decision addressing this problem was taken in late 2004, when Fahim was replaced by Abdul Rahim Wardak, a Pashtun. Steps such as this, aimed at "softening" perceptions of a disadvantageous new order on the part of some groups, coincide with recommendations from the so-called integrative approach to managing conflict in deeply divided societies. Associated above all with the work of Donald Horowitz,[41] this approach takes as a point of departure that (ethnic) identities are not fixed but malleable and that policy recommendations should reflect that. In this context, replacing Fahim with a Pashtun was probably a good idea; legislating that the minister of defense should always belong to one particular group would clearly be a bad one.

Security sector reform in Kosovo since 1999 provides examples both of what can be achieved when international actors put their leverage to work and of the limitations to that leverage when confronting an unwelcoming local force. In this province, which does not yet have an army, the security institution where international forces have made the most effort to promote multiethnicity is the Kosovo Police Service (KPS). Though perhaps half of this force, which was built up from scratch, consists of former guerilla fighters from the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), it has been hailed as one of the great success stories of the international administration.[42] On the other hand, the UN administration (UNMIK) has struggled to get the former KLA, later reorganized into a civil protection force known as the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), to agree to a force reduction from five to three thousand. Seeing itself as the future army of an independent Kosovo, the KPC still hosts radical Albanian nationalists who often serve as spoilers for ethnic relations, and it has minimal minority participation. Enver Sopjani, a senior security adviser to Kosovo Prime Minister Bajram Kosumi, has claimed that there are many high-ranking officials from different ethnic groups in the KPC. "Of course on the Serbian side one is aware that in future the KPC will become Kosovo's army. Many Serbs accept this fact, and therefore many participate in the KPC," he stated.[43] The actual number of Serbs in the KPC, however, has been reported to be as low as thirty-one.[44]

Creating the KPC was a way for UNMIK to manage former KLA forces immediately after the conflict, but hopes that its culture would ameliorate over time have not been fulfilled: to the extent that the KPC serves as a nationbuilding tool, it does

so for an exclusively ethnic-Albanian project.[45] The dilemma for UNMIK, then, is how to manage this force, which is refusing to change. At the same time, the actual nationbuilding impact of the multiethnic KPS may be questioned. One reason is its level of professionalism: many of its members have received only a minimum of training before being sent into service. Another factor is the low level of trust that both Albanian and minority members have in the KPS. Trust among the minorities is critical to the wider goals of enabling refugee returns and securing multiethnicity in Kosovo. However, polls show that it is not the KPS, but rather the NATO-led international security force KFOR, that commands the most trust among both Albanian and minority Kosovars.[46]

One critical limitation to the nationbuilding impact of a new national army is the fact that outside powers involved in the SSR will also have their own agendas, which may be more or less compatible with the aim of national integration. One factor that has an impact on the nationbuilding potential of a military force is the *objectives* the force serves; if these are not commonly shared—in particular, if a possible threat is not perceived as such equally by different groups in the population—this potential is less likely to be fulfilled. This may well be the case with the new ANA. At present, a prime task for this army is to fight not only al-Qaeda but also Taliban remnants in the south and east of the country, as much for the sake of the U.S. "war on terror"—if not more so—as for domestic objectives. Given that the Taliban had a very pronounced Pashtun character, and that the areas that are affected by the fighting (and not benefiting as much from reconstruction) are the Pashtun ones, this circumstance is reducing the unifying, nationbuilding potential of the ANA. Comparable situations, whereby "national" armies are engaged in nonunifying tasks, could develop in Kosovo and Iraq. In Kosovo, the Serb minority in the enclaves south of the Ibar River has a diametrically opposite view of Serbia's armed forces than does the Albanian majority. In a possible future independent Kosovo, Serbs who remain would continue to see Serbia as the main "homeland," and the need for protection would still be seen as directed against Albanians, not Serbia. In Iraq, men enlisting to serve in the new security institutions are the prime target of (Sunni) fighters resisting the U.S. occupation. In a similar vein, it would be difficult for the United States and its allies to train a new military force for unifying tasks: internal security already has a religious/clan coloring, and external security would hardly be a unifying task, given, for example, the sense of affiliation with Iran among Shi'ites.

The issue of shared objectives connects to the academic debate over the relative importance of *social* cohesion (referring to various emotional bonds between group members) compared to *task* cohesion (group members' shared commitment to achieving a task) for the performance of military units.[47] The concern here, however, is not so much about how diversity might impact on performance (cf. the next section) as about diversity itself: Do shared objectives exist that may be the focal point for task cohesion where ethnic divisions limit social cohesion? Could the focus on such objectives, and the success in achieving them, contribute to interethnic

trust-building within (and possibly outside) the force? In extreme cases, the lack of shared objectives may cause a military force to disintegrate. In Iraq, unreformed militias have found their way into the new military and police forces.[48] In a worst case scenario, these forces, trained in combat by outside powers, would break into independent forces at war with each other. In terms of performance, meanwhile, it was reported in early 2006 that the number of Iraqi battalions able to operate without U.S. assistance had dropped from one to zero.[49]

Ethnic Integration and Peacebuilding: Achievements Preceding Nationhood

So far, this article has discussed traits of postintervention national armies in terms of the potential these may have in helping national integration happen. Serious problems have been pointed to that would make integration even less likely than under less conflictual conditions: the levels of ethnic conflict are higher, earlier armed forces have reflected ethnic favoritism and probably perpetrated ethnically targeted violence, outside powers may lack legitimacy to the point where they are seen as the main enemy, and more. At the same time, some factors that could make external attempts to make national armies integrative and peace-enforcing also come out of the material: external forces may have a leverage that enables them to break deadlocks between local actors (cf. Bosnia's new peacekeepers); while they should not be seen as disinterestedly altruistic, outside forces may not have clear favorites among ethnic groups and may thus have the will to enforce integrative solutions, to sanction spoilers, and to overcome obstacles caused, for example, by unequal outcomes. Indeed, in many case studies that have found little integrative effects in military service, precisely the lack of full equality between different groups within the force has been put forward as one explanation.[50]

On balance, in postconflict cases such as those examined here, the army by itself may not be the nationbuilder par excellence, despite what both scholars and politicians have thought. However, this does not mean that external forces should not aim to establish ethnically representative armies. A negatively framed argument in favor of the national army would hold that an army that is *not* representative of the population cannot easily be upheld in a society with deep divisions, if at the same time oppressive rule is being replaced with democratic governance. Trying to counter demands for equitable representation would deprive the new regime of a prime claim to legitimacy.

Although one may be skeptical about the integrative potential of the military, *ignoring* ethnic divisions when reforming armed forces in a postconflict situation of simultaneous democratization would seem, at the least, to be a lost opportunity for peacebuilding. "If the military are not inclusively and broadly representative of the religious, ethnic and geographical configurations, the process of confidence building

and nation building will be significantly hampered," argued J'Kayode Fayemi in a recent study on the military in Nigeria.[51] In postconflict cases where democratization is driven by outside powers, legitimacy gained from a representative army may be needed even more. "In most current civil wars the composition and role of the armed forces is a central point in efforts to achieve peace settlements," found Nicole Ball and Michael Brzoska.[52] Framed in a more positive way, what the limitations of the postintervention situation should mean is that we consider what might be success criteria for peacebuilding short of thorough integration. The answer may come in two parts, relating to what we might call army–*society* and army–*state* relations, respectively.

First, regarding army–society relations, SSR in a postconflict situation is not merely a question of streamlining military and other forces to improve their efficiency. It involves precisely those actors who have been parties to an armed conflict. In many cases, these still constitute a security threat within the society. Different forces exist side by side that may recently have been fighting each other, and SSR may be the one arena where peacebuilding proves to be the most difficult. At the same time, given that the fighters represent coercive power, it is similarly critical that they are brought on board. A first step has to be to defuse any threat the forces themselves constitute as well as to make sure that the population also perceives the threat to be reduced. A major achievement has already been made if renewed violence is prevented and, furthermore, if it gradually becomes less likely to happen. An ethnically mixed army—in particular, one in which all units are mixed—can contribute to this result. It can be expected to be less likely to constitute a security threat to the population itself. In particular, it will seem less threatening to members of formerly underrepresented ethnic groups and to civil society as a whole. In addition, a representative army is less likely to pursue (ethnically) divisive goals.

Besides questions of the composition of the forces and their leaders, one factor determining the forces' nationbuilding potential will also be their effectiveness and professionalism. Politicization, questionable loyalties, abuses of power, corruption, and lack of accountability either to the population or to political authorities are all factors that may characterize armed forces in the transitional stage that a postconflict situation represents. Each of these factors would reduce the nationbuilding potential of those forces. Transparency, accountability, and professionalism, on the other hand, would help them gain respectability and acceptance and make them more likely to serve the purpose of nationbuilding. In a setting of tense ethnic relations, misconduct by military forces will tend to be interpreted from an ethnic perspective. Professional conduct, on the other hand, will count positively toward building national unity. As for military forces aimed primarily at external threats, their efficiency at an early stage may not be as critical as that of forces for internal security. With a continued international presence, the threat of interstate conflict may not be very large. When that is the case, there will not be acute causes that either divide or unite the forces and the population at large as far as nationbuilding is concerned.

When a new, ethnically mixed force has recently been created, we may expect that it will not be optimally effective operationally. Conversely, it may also be that the wish to facilitate multiethnicity in military forces for nationbuilding purposes will affect the effectiveness of those forces negatively in the short term; more attention will be turned inwards, to the army itself.

That being said, it is often the case in a postconflict society that the security threat emanates from inside the country, from those forces that have been engaged in the fighting, and the military is also a means of absorbing and neutralizing ex-combatants. Hence, partly disabling the capabilities of the forces could even be beneficial. Criticism over the May 2003 decision to disband the Iraqi army of 350,000 relates precisely to this: the point was not necessarily that the occupying forces needed all that manpower but, rather, that the army might nevertheless be maintained, "if only to keep that many trained, armed and potentially disgruntled men busy."[53] In Kosovo, up to 50 percent of recruits to the multiethnic KPS set up by UNMIK had a background from the KLA. "One could ask whether this was a good idea," reflected Nils Bechmann, who served in 2002 and 2003 as deputy police commissioner for the 9,500-strong police force in Kosovo. "I think including them was the best option. If we had not done that we might have had the same people working against us."[54] In Rwanda, the tragically failed Arusha Peace Agreement of 1993 had laid out a meticulous plan for a new integrated army of 19,000 men, with a key to proportional representation (60 percent for the government) and alternation in the holding of command posts. In the midst of all the detail, however, the protocol overlooked the issue of financing the demobilization of 35,000 soldiers and their absorption into a constrained civilian labor market, found Gilbert M. Khadiagala.[55] In East Timor at present, the major security problem is not the border with Indonesia but unofficial groups of disenchanted veterans from the Falintil resistance force. Whereas President Xanana Gusmão has invested much effort into dialogue with the veterans, the Fretilin government's response to this challenge has been heavy-handed, and the groups are generally spoken of as an internal terrorist threat.[56] "This could give rise to a new form of struggle against the government," cautioned Aniceto Guterres Lopez, chairman of the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation.[57]

Second, the point about disabling capabilities would be equally valid in relation to army–*state* relations, particularly the threat of military intervention into politics. In a postconflict setting, SSR is to a large extent about bringing existing armed groups and forces under legitimate civilian control. Even when existing forces are under state control, the "monopoly of coercive power" that defines Max Weber's state is questionable. Different factions within a government may represent different interests or even different sides in the recent conflict. After armed conflict with a strong ethnic dimension, bringing under real central control the different forces that have taken part in a conflict can also help to reduce the salience of such divisions—pushing through a shift from an ethnic to a nonethnic loyalty in the leadership. This

may be the single most critical challenge, but it is also a very complicated one. Key leaders may have justified their claims to power in terms of their representing certain (ethnic) group interests, and they might not wish to abandon those claims. One specific aspect of an armed force that contributes to its nationbuilding effect is the fact that its servicemen and servicewomen are often rotated to different parts of the country, away from their place of origin. This, in turn, encourages loyalty both to the force and to the central authorities. It is no coincidence that officer and troop rotation has been suggested as one means in Afghanistan to sever the patron–client links between warlords and their subordinates and to instead build loyalty to the national army among the ANA personnel.[58]

Conclusions

Security sector reform is now widely acknowledged as a core component of comprehensive peacebuilding efforts. In postconflict societies that are deeply divided along ethnic lines, the building of a new, more inclusive army is a major challenge. If it is done successfully, however, such a force may contribute toward nationbuilding that transcends ethnic divisions, reducing their salience—and thus the risk of new armed conflict. With an externally driven process, the military can be more than a mirror of society and its cleavages. A national army could, if not build a new nation on its own, then at least influence perceptions of what a nation might constitute.

The specific cases of postintervention institution building discussed here provide a distinct setting, with distinct limitations and opportunities. This article has not attempted to estimate the overall effect of these specifics by weighing the impact of the leverage of external forces against problems they may have legitimacy-wise or the distrust caused by recent conflict against the opportunities provided by new institutions. Rather, the ambition has been limited to identifying the limitations and opportunities that these cases provide in relation to the integrative potential of armies.

We should not have too high expectations as to what integrative impact a national army by itself can have either internally or on society as a whole in a postconflict situation. However, one should note that any progress can be of great significance in a postconflict, postintervention setting. Most elementarily, the situation calls for enemies to "embrace peace, if not each other," as Daniel Byman has phrased it.[59] A national army may contribute to this from the start, by increasing the sense of security among different groups in the population and reducing the risk of military interference in politics—both effects reducing potential threats emanating from the army itself. If the military is not the integrative institution par excellence, it can certainly be one integrative institution among several. The growing consensus that international peace operations must be comprehensive to be successful also in building peace is accompanied by an increasing agreement that peacebuilding has many

things to play on. Peacebuilding can be, and should be, multidimensional. In a postconflict setting, ethnic integration to the point where assimilation becomes a real issue is highly unlikely. But well before that point is reached, institutions that serve to soften ethnic divisions have contributed to peacebuilding.

Notes

1. While nationbuilding is here seen as relating directly to citizens' identity, statebuilding encompasses activities such as the building of political institutions, the strengthening of civil society, and the holding of elections.

2. See Sven Gunnar Simonsen, "Addressing Ethnic Divisions in Post-Conflict Institution-Building: Lessons from Recent Cases," *Security Dialogue* 36, 3 (2005): 297–318.

3. See, for example, Katharine Belmont, Scott Mainwaring, and Andrew Reynolds, "Introduction: Institutional Design, Conflict Management, and Democracy," in *The Architecture of Democracy: Constitutional Design, Conflict Management, and Democracy*, ed. Andrew Reynolds (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 1-11.

4. "Security sector reform" encompasses a broader range of institutions and processes than those that are examined in this article; see, for example, Nicole Ball, *Enhancing Security Sector Governance: A Conceptual Framework for UNDP* (New York: United Nations Development Program, 2000).

5. Kosovo does not have an army of its own, but it features in this discussion because it offers several lessons regarding security institutions and ethnic integration.

6. As regards methodology, this article rests on multiple sources of evidence, including fieldwork interviews and primary sources collected for studies the author has earlier conducted of postconflict, postintervention nationbuilding—in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and East Timor—as well as secondary sources on those and the other cases considered here.

7. This approach coincides with what has been termed "analytical generalization," by which replication may be claimed if two or more cases are shown to support the same theory. See Robert K. Yin, *Case Study Research. Design and Methods*, 3rd ed. (London: Sage, 2003), 32-33.

8. For an overview of traits seen as characterizing military institutions, see Marion J. Levy Jr., "Armed Force Organizations," in *The Military and Modernization*, ed. Henry S. Bienen (Chicago: Aldine Atherton, 1971), 41-78.

9. For a recent discussion of possible integrative mechanisms, see also Ronald R. Krebs, "A School for the Nation? How Military Service Does Not Build Nations, and How It Might," *International Security* 28, 4 (2004): 85–124.

10. Dimitri K. Simes, "The Military and Militarism in Soviet Society," *International Security* 6, 3 (1981/1982): 123–43, at 136.

11. Ellen Jones, *Red Army and Society: A Sociology of the Soviet Military* (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1985), 203. Interestingly, Dmitrii Miliutin, Alexander II's reformist war minister, wished in a similar vein to include nonethnic Russians in the Russian imperial army; he "insisted that the army was both a reflection of the broader political community and a transformative agent within it." See Joshua A. Sanborn, *Drafting the Russian Nation: Military Conscription, Total War, and Mass Politics, 1905–1925* (De Kalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2003), 65. For a study of the position of (Russian) ethnicity in the post-Soviet Russian military, see Sven Gunnar Simonsen, "Marching to a Different Drum? Political Orientations and Nationalism in Russia's Armed Forces," *Communist Studies & Transition Politics* 17, 1 (2001): 41-64.

12. Lucian W. Pye, "Armies in the Process of Political Modernization," in *The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries*, ed. John J. Johnson (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1962), 69–89, at 82–83.

13. Morris Janowitz, *Military Institutions and Coercion in the Developing Nations* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), 157.

14. Eric A. Nordlinger, *Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1977), 151.

15. Henry Dietz, Jerrold Elkin, and Maurice Roumani, "The Military as a Vehicle for Social Integration," in *Ethnicity, Integration, and the Military*, ed. Henry Dietz, Jerrold Elkin, and Maurice Roumani, IUS Special Editions of Armed Forces and Society no. 3 (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1991), 1-26, at 9. It should be noted that these authors defined social integration in fairly rigid terms, as "unifying and bringing together what might have been previously separate entities into a whole whose constituent parts have been blended so as to make subsequent separation difficult or impossible" (pp. 1-2).

16. It could be argued that it is misleading to describe Afghanistan and Iraq as "postconflict": there is still a level of armed conflict in both countries; in addition, although (or because) their regimes were extremely repressive, neither had a high level of internal armed conflict before intervention took place.

17. See, for example, Thomas Carothers, *Aiding Democracy Abroad. The Learning Curve* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999); and Roland Paris, *At War's End. Building Peace after Civil Conflict* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). For a recent quantitative survey, see Mark Peceny and Jeffrey Pickering, "Can Liberal Intervention Build Liberal Democracy?" in *Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding in Post-War Societies. Sustaining the Peace*, ed. T. David Mason and James D. Meernik (New York: Routledge, 2006), 130-48. An insightful contribution based on the Iraqi case is Larry Diamond, "Lessons from Iraq," *Journal of Democracy* 16, 1 (January 2005): 9-23.

18. Cynthia Enloe, *Ethnic Soldiers: State Security in Divided Societies* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1980), 15.

19. See Renèe de Nevers, "Democratization and Ethnic Conflict," *Survival* 35, 2 (1993): 31–48, at 37-38.

20. Mats Berdal, *Disarmament and Demobilisation after Civil Wars*, Adelphi Paper no. 303 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies [IISS], 1996), 54–55.

21. "New Afghan Defense Minister Praises Warlord Predecessor. Vows to Work to Build Strong Army," *PakTribune*, December 30, 2004.

22. Walter B. Slocombe, "Iraq's Special Challenge: Security Sector Reform 'Under Fire,' in *Reform and Reconstruction of the Security Sector*, ed. Alan Bryden and Heiner Hänggi (Geneva, Switzerland: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces [DCAF], 2004).

23. Jacques van Doorn, "Armed Forces and Society: Patterns and Trends," in *Armed Forces and Society: Sociological Essays*, ed. Jacques van Doorn (The Hague, the Netherlands: Mouton, 1968), 39-51, at 45.

24. Maury D. Feld, *The Structure of Violence: Armed Forces as Social Systems* (London: Sage, 1977), 145.

25. Colin Gleichmann, Michael Odenwald, Kees Steenken, and Adrian Wilkinson, *Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration: A Practical Field and Classroom Guide* (German Technical Co-operation—Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit [GTZ], Norwegian Defence International Centre [NODEFIC], Pearson Peacekeeping Centre [PPC], Swedish National Defence College [SNDC], 2004), 73, http://www.fhs.se/upload/DDRHandbook.pdf.

26. One example here is the ethnically targeted violence perpetrated by different forces in the Afghan civil war in the early 1990s.

27. See Sven Gunnar Simonsen, "Ethnicizing Afghanistan? Inclusion and Exclusion in Post-Bonn Institution-Building," *Third World Quarterly* 25, 4 (2004): 707-29.

28. Mark Sedra, "Consolidating an Elusive Peace: Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan," in Bryden and Hänggi, *Reform and Reconstruction*, 7–8.

29. See "Lions at Bay," *The Economist*, August 25, 2005.

30. International Crisis Group, "Iraq: Building a New Security Structure," in *Middle East Report* no. 20 (Brussels: International Crisis Group, December 23, 2003).

31. International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty* (Ottawa, Canada: International Development Research Centre, 2001), 41.

32. Johanna Mendelson Forman, "Can the Coalition Transform the Iraqi Security Sector before It's Too Late?" *BICC Bulletin* 29 (October 1, 2003): 1; and Karin von Hippel, "Back-Pedalling in Iraq: Lessons Unlearned," *Conflict, Security & Development* 4, 1 (2004): 79-89, at 83.

33. Author's interview with Ahmad Fahim Hakim, Delhi, India, November 2005.

34. This point has been elaborated in Krebs, "A School for the Nation?"

35. "A Toolbox to Respond to Conflicts and Build Peace," *Conflict Prevention Web*, http://www.caii.com/CAIIStaff/Dashboard_GIROAdminCAIIStaff/Dashboard_CAIIAdminDatabase/resources/ghai/toolbox7.htm (accessed January 5, 2006).

36. Marina Caparini, "Security Sector Reform and Post-Conflict Stabilisation: The Case of the Western Balkans," in Bryden and Hänggi, *Reform and Reconstruction*, 9.

37. See, for example, Roberto Belloni, "Peacebuilding and Consociational Electoral Engineering in Bosnia and Herzegovina," *International Peacekeeping* 11, 2 (2004): 336–37.

38. See "Former Bosnian Foes Find Ethnic Unity in Iraq," *Agence France-Presse,* September 3, 2005.

39. An ethnic mixing of units did not seem to be in the cards in the short term. Prior to the passing of the reforms, the commander of NATO headquarters in Sarajevo, General Stephen Schook, said a division of the army into regiments would allow the "entities" that make up Bosnia to preserve their military traditions and history. Ahto Lobjakas, "Bosnia-Herzegovina: NATO Aims to Merge Rival Armies into Single Bosnian Force," RFE/RL, August 18, 2005. Critics pointed out that ethnic groups would have a veto over military affairs through the joint presidency and that there would be three separate brigades and command centers. RFE/RL Newsline, December 29, 2005.

40. Cynthia Enloe, "Ethnicity, Bureacracy and State-Building in Africa and Latin America," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 1, 3 (1978): 336-51, at 341–42.

41. See, for example, Donald L. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985).

42. See, for example, William G. O'Neill, *Kosovo: An Unfinished Peace*, International Peace Academy Occasional Papers Series (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002), 110–11.

43. Author's interview with Enver Sopjani, Pristina, Kosovo, May 2005.

44. Caparini, ""Security Sector Reform and Post-Conflict Stabilisation," 23.

45. Sven Gunnar Simonsen, "Nationbuilding as Peacebuilding: Racing to Define the Kosovar," *International Peacekeeping* 11, 2 (2004): 289-311.

46. Scores differ greatly between groups, however: a late 2005 poll found that 90.3 percent of Kosovo Albanian respondents were "satisfied" or "very satisfied" with the NATO Kosovo Force's (KFOR's) work, whereas the corresponding figure for the Kosovo Police Service (KPS) was 89.4 percent. Among Kosovo Serbs, satisfaction with KFOR was at 28.4 percent, and with the KPS as low as 2.5 percent. See United Nations Development Program, *Early Warning Report Kosovo* no. 12 (New York: United Nations Development Program, October-December 2005), 36.

47. For a discussion of the concept of cohesion and its utility in the military context, see Uzi Ben-Shalom, Zeev Lehrer, and Eyal Ben-Ari, "Cohesion during Military Operations: A Field Study on Combat Units in the Al-Aqsa Intifada," Armed Forces & Society 32, no. 1 (2005): 63-79.

48. For a discussion of the mixed loyalties within Iraq's army and police forces, see Matt Sherman, "Iraq's Little Armies," *New York Times*, March 8, 2006.

49. Per A. Christiansen, "Iraks indre fare" [Iraq's Danger Within], *Aftenposten* (Oslo, Norway), March 11, 2006.

50. See, for example, Dietz, Elkin, and Roumani, "The Military as a Vehicle."

51. J'Kayode Fayemi, "Entrenched Militarism and the Future of Democracy in Nigeria," in *Political Armies. The Military and Nation Building in the Age of Democracy*, ed. Kees Koonings and Dirk Krujit

(London: Zed Books, 2002), 204-37, at 231. For a recent comparative study of military intervention in politics in West Africa, see Patrick J. McGowan, "Coups and Conflict in West Africa, 1955-2004: Part I, Theoretical Perspectives," *Armed Forces & Society* 32, 1 (2005): 5-23.

52. Nicole Ball and Michael Brzoska, Voice and Accountability in the Security Sector, with Kees Kingma and Herbert Wulf, BICC Paper 21 (Bonn, Germany: Bonn International Center for Conversion [BICC], 2002), 23.

53. von Hippel, "Back-Pedalling in Iraq," 83; and Peter Slevin, "Wrong Turn at a Postwar Crossroads? Decision to Disband Iraqi Army Cost U.S. Time and Credibility," *Washington Post*, November 20, 2003.

54. Author's interview with Nils Bechmann, Belgrade, Yugoslavia, June 2005.

55. Gilbert M. Khadiagala, "Implementing the Arusha Peace Agreement on Rwanda," in *Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements*, ed. Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rotschild, and Elizabeth M. Cousens (London: Lynne Rienner, 2002), 463-98, at 479.

56. Sven Gunnar Simonsen, "The Authoritarian Temptation in East Timor: Nationbuilding and the Need for Inclusive Governance," *Asian Survey* 46, 4 (2006): n.p.

57. Author's interview with Aniceto Guterres Lopez, Dili, East Timor, February 2004.

58. Human Rights Watch, *"Killing You Is a Very Easy Thing for Us": Human Rights Abuses in Southeast Afghanistan*, Human Rights Watch Report 15, no. 2 (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2003).

59. Daniel L. Byman, *Keeping the Peace: Lasting Solutions to Ethnic Conflict* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002), 213.

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